Seton Hall University

eRepository @ Seton Hall
Law School Student Scholarship

Seton Hall Law

2016

No Need to Fear Robots: Online “Bot” Use under
the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Peter F. Bariso III

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Bariso III, Peter F., "No Need to Fear Robots: Online “Bot” Use under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act" (2016). Law School
Student Scholarship. 757.
https://scholarship.shu.edu/student_scholarship/757

No Need to Fear Robots: Online “Bot” Use under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
Peter F. Bariso III*

I. Introduction

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) is a powerful statute that can combat online theft
and protect digital information.1 Congress originally discussed these objectives in the early 1980s
and enacted the CFAA in 1986 in the midst of the Digital Revolution.2 As digital machinery began
to quickly replace analog and mechanical devices, Congress needed a statute with the ability to
grow alongside this new technology.3 The CFAA was meant to be malleable and adapt over time
with ever-changing innovation.4 At inception in 1986, however, the idea of a global internet, not
to mention numerous other online technologies that now exist, was not even conceivable.
Congress designed the CFAA to be flexible because digital technology was new, but this
flexibility has been misused.

If courts can freely expand the statute as broadly as they please,

prosecutors will arguably be incentivized to exploit the CFAA and seek criminal sanctions based
on untenable statutory interpretations.5 The Committee on the Judiciary expressly recognized that
deterring unwanted computer actions begins with the private website owners and not federal law

*

J.D. Candidate, 2016, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.S., 2007, Indiana University Kelley School of
Business. Thank you to Professor David Opderbeck for helping with this comment, from basic idea to finished
product. Thank you also my family and to all of the members of the Seton Hall Law Review.
1 See infra Part II.
2 See infra Part II; Digital Revolution, TECHNOPEDIA, http://www.techopedia.com/definition/23371/digitalrevolution (last visited Jan. 5, 2015).
3 See infra Part II; Digital Revolution, TECHNOPEDIA, http://www.techopedia.com/definition/23371/digitalrevolution (last visited Jan. 5, 2015).
4 See infra Part II; Digital Revolution, TECHNOPEDIA, http://www.techopedia.com/definition/23371/digitalrevolution (last visited Jan. 5, 2015).
5 See Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act , 94 M INN. L. REV. 1561, 1557
(2010) (“The CFAA is a remarkably broad statute, and . . . federal prosecutors eventually will try to exploit the
breadth and ambiguity of the statute to bring prosecutions based on aggressive readings of the statute.”).
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or the court system.6 The CFAA and courts cannot be used to rubberstamp every website owner
practice with a seal of approval, making any other action illegal. Not every objectionable internet
behavior is criminal and covered by the CFAA.

“More comprehensive and effective self-

protection by private business” is the best means of prevention, and website owners bear this
responsibility, not the government.7
A hacker can be either “an expert at programming and solving problems with a computer,” or
“a person who illegally gains access to and sometimes tampers with information in a computer
system.”8 While the former definition encompasses benign activity, the latter has gained much
more notoriety. This secondary definition focuses on CFAA violators in that it covers individ ua ls
who do not have authorization to access a computer as well as those who go beyond their
authorized access.9 Therefore, at least as to the second definition, hackers are synonymous with
criminal violators.

The first definition, while entirely accurate and still popular within the

computer programming world, has transitioned outside of that sphere and somewhat merged with
the second definition.

The term hacker is now used much more broadly to add a negative

connotation to anyone who uses a computer in a new or unconventional, although perfectly legal,
way.10 By using a word that connotes illegal behavior but may describe legal actions, website
owners and prosecutors have persuaded courts to prohibit benign internet conduct.11
Website owners have successfully induced the court to extend the CFAA beyond what
Congress intended.12

This has resulted in criminal punishment for behavior not originally

6

S. REP. 99-432, 3, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2479, 2481.
Id. (quoting Report on Computer Crime; Task Force on Computer Crime, Section of Criminal Justice, American
Bar Association; June 1984).
8 Hacker Definition, M ERRIAM -W EBST ER ONLINE, http://www.merriamwebster.com (last visited Jan. 29, 2015).
9 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008).
10 Robert Siciliano, Are All Hackers Bad?, M CAFEE (Sep. 2, 2014), http://blogs.mcafee.com/consumer/are-allhackers-bad (Tesla, Facebook, and Google all use individuals traditionally thought of as “hackers” in many ways).
11 Id.
12 See, infra Part III.
7
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conceived as such under the CFAA’s purview. As technology changes the ways in which the
internet is used and online business is carried out, website owners try to protect their informa tio n
and competitive edge by any means necessary. If private information is truly hacked, as per the
second definition above, and acquired through unauthorized means, the behavior may be violating
the CFAA. While this is not disputed, online businesses sometimes seek to punish users who
gather publicly available information with identical penalties.13 Automated programming code,
often called “bots,” “scrapers,” “scrubbers,” or “data mining,” has become a useful tool to amass
large amounts of data much faster and more efficiently than any individual or group of users. 14
Computer programmers generally develop an automated program that, once set in motion, works
independently to pool whatever information the programmer created the “bot” to seek out. While
this may be used to hack onto websites or servers and steal protected information, it is more
commonly used to gather innocuous, public data.15 The majority of “bot” executions search out
and compile public information into user-friendly databases.16
Independent of the CFAA, website owners are free to develop their own contracts with website
users. These contracts, often called Terms of Service, set the parameters of use for anyone who
visits the website. They are often long, carefully drafted, legal documents which are overlooked

13

Id.
Michael Schrenk, Webbots, Spiders, and Screen Scrapers: A Guide to Developing Internet Agents with
PHP/CURL 6 (2nd ed. 2012).
15 Data Mining and Analytics, SOCIET Y FOR INDUST RIAL AND A PPLIED M ATHEMATICS,
http://www.siam.org/activity/dma/ (last visited Oct. 27, 2014).
16 A VI RAPPAPORT , ROBOT S & SPIDERS & CRAWLERS: HOW W EB AND INT RANET SEARCH ENGINES FOLLOW LINKS T O
BUILD INDEXES, available at http://cis.poly.edu/cs912/rappoport.pdf; See also, Semrush, Semrush Bot, available at
http://www.semrush.com/bot/ (“Most bots are both harmless and quite beneficial.”); but see, Incapsula 2014 Global
Bot Traffic Report: Understanding Bot behavior and threats to websites 2, available at
http://lp.incapsula.com/rs/incapsulainc/images/2014-bot-traffic-report.pdf (reporting a new 50/50 split between good
“bot” traffic and “bad” bot traffic on the internet over the past two years) (It should be noted, however, that
Incapsula, Inc. specializes in website security and protection from “bots” and is thus incentivized to paint landscape
with an increased threat. Semrush on the other hand is a marketing company that provides bot services to its
customers and is equally incentivized to portray “bots” in a positive light. At the same time, the sources
theoretically measure different values —the former being number of “bots” and the latter “bot” traffic.)
14
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by the general public.17 On occasion users have to click “I agree” to pass onto the website, but in
most instances they are not even conspicuous and can only be viewed via a link on the bottom of
the site. In any case, website owners are free to draft these Terms of Service for their individ ua l
domain names, thereby creating a contractual relationship with individual users which impose
restrictions on the use of the website.18 The problem arises when these Terms of Service are
violated and the website owner seeks to use the CFAA as a remedy in lieu of a proper breach of
contract claim.
Commenters and the courts alike have disagreed over whether the CFAA can be used to
criminalize these contractual breaches in all situations. Some previous comments have focused on
individual users obtaining public information from websites generally, without reference to
“bots”.19 Others focused on whether a breach of a website Terms of Service could qualify as
“unauthorized access” or “exceeding authorized access.”20 Additional comments addressed Terms
of Service breaches and civil claims under the CFAA.21
While most of these comments agree that the courts should not apply the CFAA to a broad
contract-based theory of liability, the majority argue that not every contract breach to acquire

17

Rachel Feltman, Londoners accidentally pay for free Wi-Fi with a firstborn, because no one reads anymore, THE
W ASHINGT ON POST (Sep. 29, 2014) (Proving that no one reads Terms of Service, an experiment in London had
people agree to pay for WiFi service in exchange for permanent loss of a child); See, also, Mike Masnick, To Read
All Of The Privacy Policies You Encounter, You'd Need To Take A Month Off Fro m Work Each Year, TECHDIRT
(Apr. 23, 2012), https://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120420/ 10560418585/to-read-all-privacy-policies-youencounter-youd-need-to-take-month-off-work-each-year.shtml (Noting that for the average internet users, reading all
the Terms of Service agreements on every webpage visited would take one month a year).
18 Best Practices for Drafting Terms of Use, 6TH A NNUAL E-COMMERCE BEST PRACT ICES CONFERENCE ,
https://www.law.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/event/266629/media/slspublic/BPfnlPresentation0608.pdf, (last
visited Feb. 12, 2015).
19 Christine D. Galbraith, Access Denied: Improper Use of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to Control
Information on Publicly Accessible Internet Websites, 63 M D. L. REV. 320, 368 (2004).
20 Orin S. Kerr, Cybercrime's Scope: Interpreting Access and Authorization in Computer Misuse Statutes, 78 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1596, 1630 (2003).
21 Patricia L. Bellia, Defending Cyberproperty, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2164, 2186 (2004); but see Caroline G. Jones,
Computer Hackers on the Cul-De-Sac: Myspace Suicide Indictment Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act Sets
Dangerous Precedent, 17 W IDENER L. REV. 261, 267 (2011) (“theoretically the law fits the crime as charged”).
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public information on a website should be immune from the CFAA. 22 Some commenters argue
that code based tools that provide extra security and deterrence should be a guide for the CFAA.23
They argue that, if a website requires individual input or employs additional measures before
access, such as checkout page encryption, CAPTCHA code, or internet protocol blocks, and
subsequent use is obtained despite this, the situation is more akin to unlawful hacking and should
be grounds for a CFAA claim.24
This Comment focuses on the use of electronic code and automated “bots,” specifically on
their use in buypage, or checkout page, encryption, Completely Automated Public Turing test to
tell Computers and Humans Apart (CAPTCHA) protections, Internet Protocol blocks, and other
measures used by website owners to enforce their Terms of Service contracts. Those commenters
that argued the CFAA applies to all “bot” use often cite to prosecutorial discretion as a way to
remedy the gap between less harmful “benign hacking” of public information and serious
violations of the CFAA.25 This public policy argument, while reasonable in theory, could have
disastrous consequences in practice if an alleged violator piques the interest of a politician or
prosecutor looking to make a name for themselves or set an example of the alleged violator. Courts
similarly have analyzed breach of Terms of Service CFAA claims in different ways. While some
courts found contractual breaches a sufficient basis for a CFAA claim26 others recognized the
dangers of such a broad policy.27

22

Jones, supra note 21, at 265–66.
Id. at 271; see also Katherine Mesenbring, Field, Agency, Code, or Contract: Determining Employees'
Authorization Under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act , 107 M ICH. L. REV. 819, 821 (2009).
24 Jones, supra note 21, at 271.
25 Mesenbring, supra note 23, at 838–840 (focused more on employee/employer relationships and CFAA).
26 Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058, 1071 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
27 LVRC Holdings LLC v. Brekka, 581 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2009); see also, United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854,
863 (9th Cir. 2012).
23
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Part II of this Comment will first discuss an overview of automated software robots and their
history in society. Part III will discuss a brief overview of the CFAA. Part III will also focus on
the background of the CFAA. Part IV will discuss the history of automated software robots in the
court system and evolving views on their legality.

Part IV will also address previous CFAA

decisions under civil law and the statute’s potential expansion into the criminal sector. Part V will
highlight the benefits of automated “bots” in the internet and how they can be useful in a multitude
of areas. This part will then explain how the “damage” and “unauthorized” or “exceeding
authorized” access prongs of the CFAA are not inherently met when “bots” are employed contrary
to a website’s Terms of Service. Part V will also discuss the dangers in allowing prosecutors to
have too much discretion under the CFAA. Lastly, Part VI will conclude this Comment.

II. The Pros and Cons of Automated Software Robots

“Bots,” like hacking, can be beneficial or injurious, and can either spur technological progress,
or harm valuable resources, depending on the means and ends for which they are used. 28 The same
technology goes into both “beneficial webbots” and malicious ones.29 “Bots” do not inherently
change the structure and meaning of the CFAA. Just like other powerful tools, if used improperly
they can become a means to violate the CFAA.
“Webbots” are computer programs that are usually created for one specific purpose.30 They
automatically carry out their function once triggered by either a user action or automatically upon
the occurrence of an event.31 Once set in motion, “webbots” work according to their programmed

28

Schrenk, supra note 14, at 6.
Id.
30 Internet Bot, TECHNOPEDIA, http://www.techopedia.com/definition/24063/internet-bot (last visited Feb. 12, 2015).
31 Id.
29
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orders.32

Based on the creation of web and robot, a “webbot” works over the internet

independently and does whatever it was created to do without sustained human involvement.33
Automated “webbots” can amass information at a much larger scale and much faster speed
than any individual or large group of people. 34 “Webbots” can be created as a way to automate
virtually any online task.35 Since constant human input is not required, the “bot” works much
more quickly and without any risk of human error.
At inception, “webbots” were seen as a limitless “untapped source of potential projects for
software developers and a bountiful resource for business people.”36

“Webbots” were first

developed to customize online applications and get catered results through internet web
browsers.37 Even now, the true potential of “webbots” goes beyond any current technologica l
boundaries.38 “Bots” are used primarily for legitimate business purposes to promote efficiency or
sometimes just for convenience.
“Bots” are now a part of daily life. Even a standard search engine like Google or Yahoo! uses
“bots” called “search engine spiders” to quickly find relevant results based on a given user inputted
search term.39 Even individuals hoping to get a good reservation for dinner can make use of

32

Id.
Id.
34 Schrenk, supra note 14, at10.
35 Id.
36 Internet Bot, supra note 30 at 9.
37 Id.
38 Schrenk, supra note 14, at 9.
39 Internet Bot, supra note 30. As an example, when someone uses Google to search for information that person
types their query in the search box and prompts Google’s “bots” to scour the internet for posted content that
corresponds to the queried word or phrase. The “bots” used by Google are obviously substantially advanced and can
even predict what you are trying to have them search for before you even finish typing. They can also correct your
misspellings based on what the “bot” thinks you meant to type. At t he same time, users can override the “bot” by
using quotes around specific words as many “experienced” searchers may do.
33
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“bots.”40 There are also conspiracy theorists who believe that “bots” can be used to predict major
events and even an apocalypse.41
An increasingly large part of the economy is shifting towards automation. Customer service, 42
stock trading and banking,43 surveillance,44 shopping, and numerous other fields are moving away
from human-dominated roles toward computerized solutions.45 Naturally, there is much debate on
the pros and cons of a largely computer-run economy as compared to traditional human-drive n,
day-to-day tasks.46 Over the next two decades, it is estimated that 50% of all jobs in America will
be automated.47
An increasing number of companies are now automating their customer service operations.
Automated customer service solutions can reduce the operating and training costs that accompany
a staff of human customer service agents. 48 The use of “bots” and avatars, as they are often called
in customer service, is not without flaws, but it promotes competition and innovation. No logical

Jessica Sidman, What’s the Toughest Reservation in D.C.?, W ASHINGT ON CIT Y PAPER (Dec. 17, 2013).
Tom Chivers, ‘Web-bot project’ mak es prophecy of 2012 apocalypse, THE TELEGRAPH (Sep. 24, 2009),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/6227357/Web-bot-project-makes-prophecy-of-2012-apocalypse.html
(Obviously this “bot” has since been proved not as all-knowing as Google’s search predicting capability, see supra
note 39.).
42 Alisa Kongthon, Chatchawal Sangkeettrakarn, Sarawoot Kongyoung & Choochart Haruechaiyasak, Implementing
an Online Help Desk System Based on Conversational Agent , PROCEEDINGS OF T HE INT ERNATIONAL CONFERENCE
ON M ANAGEMENT OF EMERGENT DIGIT AL ECOSYST EMS, Oct. 27, 2009, available at
http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1643823.1643908.
43 Andrei A. Kirilenko & Andrew W. Lo., Moore’s Law versus Murphy’s Law:
Algorithmic Trading and Its Discontents, 27 J. ECON. PERSP . 51 (2013), available at
http://www.argentumlux.org/documents/Moores_Law_vs_Murphys_Law_Spring_2013_JEP.pdf.
44 Ross Anderson, An Eye Without an ‘I’: Justice and the Rise of Automated Surveillance, THE A T LANTIC (June 14,
2012), http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/06/an -eye-without-an-i-justice-and-the-rise-ofautomated-surveillance/258082/.
45 See, infra Part IV.
46 Id.
47 Carl Benedikt Frey & Michael A. Osborne, The Future of Employment: How Susceptible Are Jobs to
Compterisation? (Oxford Martin Programme on the Impacts of Future Technology,Working Paper, Sept. 17, 2013)
available at
http://www.futuretech.ox.ac.uk/sites/futuretech.ox.ac.uk/files/The_Future_of_Employment_OMS_Working_Paper_
0.pdf; Aviva Hope Rutkin, Report Suggests Nearly Half of U.S. Jobs Are Vulnerable to Computerization , MIT
TECHNOLOGY REVIEW (Sept. 12, 2013), available at http://www.technologyreview.com/view/519241/reportsuggests-nearly-half-of-us-jobs-are-vulnerable-to-computerization/.
48 Kongthon, et al., supra note 42.
40
41
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argument has been advanced that suggests that the government should control the use of customer
service bots or make it criminal.
Stock trading, particularly by hedge funds, has transitioned away from human buy and sell
orders to computer algorithms designed to pick up on clues and trade faster than any human. So
called “quant funds” or “high- frequency traders” use automated execution technology, a type of
“bot,” to execute trades based on certain triggers that the computer reads. 49 For example, when
the volume of trades on a stock hits a certain point, signaling a large block of trading, the “bot”
can act and execute trades before the incoming block trade is completed and before the stock price
continues to rise.
While some have argued this financial strategy based on “bots” was responsible for the recent
financial crisis50 , others praise its efficiency and ability to generate a profit. 51 Even small-time
stock traders who trade based on limit orders use “bots” whether they know it or not. Charles
Schwab, a brokerage and banking company, allows any investor to buy stocks using a limit order.52
This means that the computer will buy the stock automatically when it reaches a given price.53
Financial trading “bots” can be used with less than noble intentions, but the solution is not
criminalizing their use, it is competition. Institutional investors often use dark pools to keep their
trades somewhat insulated from hedge fund “bots”. Often using their own “bots”, dark pools will
execute large trades outside of the public forum so that quant funds see no triggers until the trade
is completely executed. Some quant funds have responded by monitoring large transactions and

49

RISHI K. NARANG, INSIDE T HE BLACK BOX: A SIMPLE GUIDE T O QUANTITATIVE AND HIGH FREQUENCY TRADING
5 (2013).
50 SCOT T PATTERSON, THE QUANT S: HOW A NEW BREED OF M AT H W HIZZES CONQUERED W ALL ST REET AND
NEARLY DEST ROYED IT (2011).
51 Narang, supra note 49.
52 Stock Order Types: Limit Orders, CHARLES SCHWAB, http://www.schwab.com/public/schwab/nn/articles/OrderTypes-Getting-to-Know-the-Basics#limitorder (last visited Nov. 1, 2014)
53 Id. (A sell limit order can also be executed which naturally uses a “bot” to only sell once a given price it
attained.).
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essentially using bandwidth as a trigger for trading. Once again, competition has spurred private
markets to combat this problem.54 The process accelerates innovation and society is improved as
a whole, whereas criminalizing the conduct initially does nothing but ensure one side mainta ins
freedom from competition.
“Bots” are used by individuals as well as large corporations. While some “hackers” may use
“bots” to pilfer data from private online sources, that behavior is far from the norm.55 On an
individual scale, executives can use “bots” to sift through millions of news articles and compile
only relevant stories, substantially shortening the morning reading. 56 They can also be used by
intellectual property holders to search out websites and ensure their patented creation is not being
used elsewhere.57 At the same time, just about every large internet company uses “bots”. Massive
internet corporations like Google and Yelp all use “bots” in a multitude of ways and users benefit
from these “bots” daily.58
On third-party websites, when the “bot” owner is not the website owner, “bots” are most often
used for one of three purposes: buypage encryption; internet protocol blocks; and CAPTCHA
code. Buypage, or checkout page, encryption is used by some website owners to block access to
the checkout page of a website.59 It can have a valid purpose, most notably to restrict purchase
ability to only those individuals who can legally buy—be it alcohol to minors or guns to registered

Simone Foxman, Those Flash Boys: How the “Navy Seals” of Trading are Taking on Wall Street’s Predatory
Robots, QUART Z (Mar. 31, 2014), http://qz.com/138388/how-the-navy-seals-of-trading-are-taking-on-wall-streetspredatory-robots/.
55 Schrenk, supra note 14, at 325 (This so-called “dark side” use of “destructive webbots” is a small percentage of
those in existence).
56 Id at 18.
57 Id.
58 What is Yelp’s Recommendation Software, YELP INC., http://www.yelp-support.com/article/What-is-Yelp-srecommendation-software?l=en_US (last visited Nov. 1, 2014) (As discussed in Part IV, many of these same
companies are those seeking to persuade courts to condone third -party “bot” use and allow them to set the terms of
the CFAA through their Terms of Service.); see Internet Bot, supra note 30.
59 Brief for Plaintiff-United States at 18, United States v. Lowson, 2010 WL 9552416 (D.N.J. Oct. 12, 2010) (No.
CRIM. 10-114 KSH).
54
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individuals. In this internet age, as compared to brick-and-mortar stores, it is much harder to limit
alcohol sales to minors, or to restrict firearms purchases, or to protect credit card informatio n. 60
Buypage encryption can cut out purchasing ability to certain people. It restricts certain individ ua ls
from tampering with the checkout page. This is done by the websites to shield them from liability.
Internet protocol (IP) blocks are also widely used to restrict unwanted users. They are designed
to prevent certain users originating from known locations or regions from calling up a website.
They can be used to prevent “hackers” from injecting viruses, to block access to banking
information, and to stop mass spam emails. 61 They cannot, however, be used at the whim of the
website owner to enforce his or her preference.62 When Verizon blocked IP addresses from certain
regions in Europe as a way of limiting spam to its members, it led to a class action lawsuit when
users could not access needed emails. 63 Circumventing IP blocks has blossomed into a necessary
market as well. Masking IP addresses can be a proactive way to self-protect from viruses or
hacking.64 Because IP addresses are unique to each user, they can compromise a user’s location
or identify.

Individual users can just as easily hide their IP addresses through various free

programs on the internet.65

60

See, e.g., Rebecca S. Williams & Allison Schmidt, The Sales and Marketing Practices of English-Language
Internet Alcohol Vendors, 109 SOC’Y FOR ST UD. A DDICTION RES. REP . 432 (2014); But see, Granholm v. Heald, 544
U.S. 460 (2005) (The court disagreed with New York that more protection was needed to protect online liquor stores
from access by minor. The court found “little evidence that the purchase of wine over the Internet by minors is a
problem,” because minors need “instant gratification” and can go to local liquo r stores in less time than internet
retailers.).
61 John Gartner, Verizon's E-Mail Embargo Enrages, W IRED, (Jan. 10, 2005),
http://archive.wired.com/techbiz/media/news/2005/ 01/ 66226.
62 Nate Anderson, Verizon Proposes Settlement For Class Action Lawsuit, (Apr. 5, 2006),
http://arstechnica.com/uncategorized/2006/04/6525-2/.
63 Id.
64 UnThreat technology, UNTHREAT A NTIVIRUS, http://www.unthreat.com/technology (last visited Feb. 12, 2015).
65 M ASK M Y IP, http://www.mask-myip.com/ (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
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CAPTCHA code, unlike the other two measures, is primarily used to foil automated “bots”. 66
As the name implies, CAPTCHA stands for Completely Automated Public Turing Test to Tell
Computers and Humans Apart and is designed to “capture” and trick computers.67 CAPTCHA
has a multitude of applications, only one of which is preventing malicious attacks on websites. 68
On a macro level, devices like CAPTCHA that distinguish humans from computers cannot
“guarantee that bots won’t read the pages; it only serves to say ‘no bots, please.’”69 CAPTCHA
can also be used to advance artificial intelligence and lead to technological progression.70
At the same time, CAPTCHA defeating “bots” may be necessary for some users. Individ ua ls
with vision problems are often thwarted by CAPTCHA code which is based on distorted images. 71
Alternatives to CAPTCHA that can be used by the visually impaired are being created, but lag far
behind in popularity to CAPTCHA. 72 Until these alternatives catch up, certain sections of the
population need “bots” that can help them get around CAPTCHA devices and access a site just as
anyone else can.

III. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

i.

Brief Overview of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

66

Brief for Plaintiff-United States at 19, United States v. Lowson, 2010 WL 9552416 (D.N.J. Oct. 12, 2010) (No.
CRIM. 10-114 KSH).
67 Luis von Ahn, Manuel Blum & John Langford, Telling Humans and Computers Apart Automatically: How Lazy
Cryptographers do AI, 47 COMM. ACM 57, 58 (2004), available at http://www.captcha.net/captcha_cacm.pdf.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 Id., at 59–60.
71 Computer Pioneer Aids Spam Fight, BBC NEWS, (Jan. 8, 2003),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/2635855.stm.
72 Hannah Alvarez, Think Your Site Needs CAPTCHA? Try These User-Friendly Alternatives, USER TEST ING, (Apr.
9, 2014), http://www.usertesting.com/blog/2014/04/09/think-your-site-needs-captcha-try-these-user-friendlyalternatives/.
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The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) prohibits “access” of a computer either
“without authorization” or “exceeding authorized access.”73 The statute focuses on informatio n
protected for national defense,74 financial records,75 and certain other private information obtained
fraudulently. As compared national defense documents and bank financial records, with private
information the statute is more specific and requires actual “damage” to a “protected computer.”76
The fundamental component of the CFAA is “access.” Access, however, is an antiquated
notion based on how computers worked in the 1980s when the CFAA was originally devised.
Today with the internet dominating most computing and cybersecurity concerns, the notion of
“access” makes little sense in many contexts. Historically, when computers were hardwired they
needed to be physically accessed to be used, but the internet has completely changed this line of
thinking. The internet has stripped part of what the CFAA was designed to do. Because of this,
prosecutors have successfully persuaded courts to expand the scope of the CFAA. This behavior,
however, can lead to a widening gap, in terms of Congressional intent, between the CFAA at
inception and what is has become. Courts should leave it to Congress to update the CFAA into
the modern technological world.

ii.

Background of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act was the product of an American Bar Association (ABA)
report and Congressional debate. In 1984, the American Bar Association Task Force on Computer

73

18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2008).
Id. § 1030(a)(1).
75 Id. § (a)(2)(A).
76 Id. § (a)(5)(A).
74
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Crime issued the Report on Computer Crime that found about 48% of the 1,000 private and public
agencies surveyed had experienced some form of computer crime in the previous year.77
According to the Report on Computer Crime, the most serious types of computer crime consisted
of theft of property, data destruction, financial skimming, software destruction, and fraud.78
This ABA report prompted Congress to reexamine computer crime and enact the Compute r
Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) in 1986.79

The Congressional Committee on the Judiciar y

recognized that computer crimes cause severe financial losses and regulation was needed to
safeguard against potential monetary theft.80

The Committee also realized that identifying

information, passwords, and medical records should be protected and their theft prohibited, even
absent discrete financial loss.81
Prior to enacting the CFAA, it was suggested that the federal statute should be broad “so that
no computer crime [was] potentially uncovered.”82

The Committee expressly rejected this

suggestion and sought to limit the CFAA to Federal Government computers where “certain
financial institutions are involved or where the crime itself is interstate in nature.”83
Congress designed the CFAA to criminalize computer theft, fraud, hacking, and acts that
damage electronic data and security. 84 Congress limited the CFAA’s reach based on three core

A M. BAR A SS’N SECT ION OF CRIMINAL JUST ICE, REPORT ON COMPUTER CRIME -TASK FORCE ON COMPUT ER
CRIME (June 1984), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/App/Publications/abstract.aspx?ID=95114 [hereinafter ABA
COMPUT ER CRIME REPORT].
78 Id. (The report found action needed to be taken to discourage and punish “the use of computers to steal tangible or
intangible assets, the destruction or alteration of data, the use of computers to embezzle funds, the destruction or
alteration of software, and the use of computers to defraud.”)
79 S. REP. 99-432, supra note 6, at 2.
80 Id.; ABA COMPUT ER CRIME REPORT , supra note 77.
81 S. REP. 99-432, supra note 6, at 2–3; ABA COMPUT ER CRIME REPORT , supra note 77.
82 S. REP. 99-432, supra note 6, at 4; ABA COMPUT ER CRIME REPORT , supra note 77.
83 S. REP. 99-432, supra note 6, at 4; ABA COMPUT ER CRIME REPORT , supra note 77.
84 S. REP. 99-432, supra note 6.
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ideas: the first based on national security; the second focused on financial institutions; and the
third based on private electronic theft. 85
Under the national security provision, the individual must “knowingly access[] a computer
without authorization or exceeding authorized access” and obtain information protected by an
“Executive order or statute . . . against unauthorized disclosure for reasons of national defense or
foreign relations.”86 An individual can also be guilty based on national security protection if they
“intentionally, without authorization to access any nonpublic computer of a department or agenc y
of the United States, access[] such a computer of that department or agency that is exclusively for
the use of the Government of the United States.”87
To protect financial information, the CFAA criminalizes an individual who “intentiona lly
accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds authorized access, and thereby obtains . . .
information contained in a financial record of a financial institution, or of a card issuer . . . [or] of
a consumer reporting agency on a consumer.”88
Private electronic information is also protected by the CFAA when an individual “knowingly
and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer without authorizatio n, or exceeds
authorized access” and this conduct furthers the fraud, “unless the object of the fraud and the thing
obtained consists only of the use of the computer and the value of such use is not more than $5,000
in any 1-year period.”89 The CFAA, like many Congressional statutes, can only apply to limited
private actions based on the commerce clause. The only private electronic information protected
is that on “protected computers,” defined as the computers of a financial institution or the United
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87 Id. at § 1030(a)(3).
88 Id. at § 1030(a)(2)(A).
89 Id. at § 1030(a)(4).
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States Government or, if not exclusively used by either of those two entities, computers that affect
interstate or foreign commerce.90
Each of these three core ideas centers on the principles of damage, unauthorized access, and
exceeding authorized access.

In order to violate the CFAA, the individual must first be

“unauthorized” or must deliberately “exceed[] authorized access.”91 “Unauthorized access” is
reserved for situations where the individual is not granted access.92 It does not speak to the means
of access, but simply whether that individual was allowed. 93 “Exceed[ing] authorized access”
covers individuals who are actually authorized to use a given computer.94 It is only invoked when
the individual goes beyond his or her access and actually obtains information that he or she was
not entitled to, or alters information in the computer when he or she was not allowed to do so.95
At the same time, there must be a real, tangible harm and loss to meet the “damage”
requirement of Section 1030(e)(8).96 “Damage,” encompasses harm to data or equipment that
results in a loss.97 “Damage” relates to physical, tangible impairment that leads to a real pecuniary
loss.98 The damage must be quantifiable and reach the aggregate threshold of $5,000. 99 It cannot
be an arbitrary, theoretical harm.

IV. The Court System and the CFAA
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92 See Power Equip. Maint., Inc. v. AIRCO Power Servs., Inc., 953 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1296 (S.D. Ga. 2013).
93 Id.
94 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(6) (2008).
95 Id. at § 1030(e)(6).
96 See Czech v. Wall St. on Demand, Inc., 674 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1108 (D. Minn. 2009); Yoder & Frey Auctioneers,
Inc. v. Equipment Facts, LLC, No. 14-3002, 2014 WL 7247400, at *5 (6th Cir. Dec. 22, 2014).
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i.

Automated Software Robots in the Legal System

With the advent and ever-expanding capability of “bots,” courts have inconsistently applied
the CFAA to them. The CFAA’s flexibility has been interpreted by different courts in differe nt
ways. Back in 2000, eBay, an online auction site, tried to defend its business against “bots” using
the CFAA.100 EBay argued that Bidder’s Edge (BE), a company that used “bots” to search, copy,
and aggregate eBay listings—as well as other online auction company listings—in one place, was
in violation of the CFAA.101 BE did not host any auctions, but based its business on allowing
customers to view auctions from various sites in one place. 102 The United States District Court,
for the Northern District of California, allowed an injunction against BE because it used “bots” in
violation of eBay’s Terms of Service.103 Without deciding on any one ground, the court sided with
eBay that when the software robot—which could execute thousands more tasks than a human in
the same amount of time—was used, it drained eBay’s capacity and resources, increasing the
likelihood of a system crash.104 The court only enjoined BE’s activity as long as “bots” were
involved and made clear that no information obtained with a non-automated program was
precluded.105
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, overseeing the District Court in
California that decided Ebay, Inc., vacillated on the relevance of “bots” to a valid CFAA claim. 106
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Ebay, Inc. v. Bidder's Edge, 100 F. Supp. 2d 1058 (N.D. Cal.2000).
Id.
102 Id at 1061.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 1061-62 (The District Court allowed a preliminary injunction without evidence of any real crash, but
merely a theoretical increased likelihood, but the case did not progress further.); Id. at 1071 (The court also
recognized that “eBay does not claim that this consumption has led to any physical damage to eBay's computer
system, nor does eBay provide any evidence to support the claim that it may have lost revenues or customers based
on this use[.]”).
105 Id. at 1073.
106 United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 856, 862–63 (9th Cir. Cal. 2012).
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When a former employee of an executive search firm convinced some of his former colleagues ,
who still worked at the firm, to transmit him confidential information from the company’s server
to help start a competing business, the employer sought sanctions via the CFAA. 107 The current
employees were allowed to access the database, but could not disclose the confidential informa tio n
to someone outside of the company.108 Because of this, the employer argued that the “exceeding
access” requirement was met.109 The court avoided the question of whether Terms of Service
could serve as the basis for a criminal CFAA claim. 110 The court did, however, find that using
“bots” in contravention of a Terms of Service policy does not constitute “exceeding authorized
access.”111 The CFAA is not concerned with misappropriation liability and “bots” that violate a
contractual Terms of Service are outside the scope of the CFAA.112
The same District Court in California tried to reconcile past cases when Craigslist, another
independent sales website, sought to limit “bot” use from a competitor through its Terms of
Service.113 3Taps was a company that employed “bots” to copy content posted on Craigslist,
aggregate it, and republish.114 After 3Taps ignored a cease and desist letter, Craigslist brought a
CFAA suit against 3Taps.115

Craigslist argued that 3Taps violated the Terms of Service it

implicitly agreed to by using Craigslist’s website, and thus exceeded its authorized access under
1030(e)(8) of the CFAA.116 The court looked to Nosal and found the term “exceeds authorized
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Id. at 856.
Id.
109 Id.
110 Id. at 863 (“We need not decide today whether Congress could base criminal liability on violations of a company
or website's computer use restrictions.”).
111 Id.
112 Nosal, 676 F.3d at 863.
113 Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 968–70 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
114 Id. at 966.
115 Id. at 967.
116 Id.
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access” only relates to access restrictions and not to how the information is used. 117 The District
Court avoided the key question of whether a website’s Terms of Service violation “can ever
support liability under the CFAA.”118 The District Court did, however, find the cease and desist
letter determinative for “unauthorized access” under 1030(a)(1).119 Because Craigslist denied
3Taps access “for any purposes” via the cease and desist letter, any later use violated the CFAA.120
Another Federal District Court in similar circumstances to those presented in Califor nia
Federal Court did not grant an injunction to the company seeking to insulate itself from “bots”
through Terms of Service.121 Southwest Airlines used a business model that awarded customers
better boarding options depending on how quickly they checked-in once they were allowed. 122
Boardfirst used “bots” to automatically check-in Southwest customers as quickly as possible once
they were allowed by Southwest.123

Twenty-four hours before the flight Southwest allowed

customers to check-in and any customers that paid Boardfirst $5 were virtually guaranteed to be
checked-in first and thus granted priority boarding.124 This is because the “bots” used by Boardfirst
could complete their task in a fraction of the time any individual customer could. The “bots” could
execute the task they were programmed to do and checked-in customers instantly, much faster than
any actual Southwest customer could type southwest.com let alone go through the steps to checkin. Using a similar breach of the Terms of Service logic, Southwest argued Boardfirst was not
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119 Id. at 969.
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121 Southwest Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C.,2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96230 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007).
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only violating the Terms of Service, but also the CFAA. 125 The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Texas found that, contract claims aside, there was no federal violatio n 126
The CFAA charge was not valid and could not be used to sustain an injunction, especially given
that Southwest’s website was a “publicly available website that anyone [could] access and use.”127
The court was not swayed by a Terms of Service violation and found no actual impairment or
damage.128
In a recent CFAA case involving “bots,” criminal charges were brought against an events ticket
reseller for using automated software. 129 Like many previous “bot” cases, a website owner tried
to argue that criminal fraud occurs when the website Terms of Service are violated whereas the
defendant argued the website owner’s charge sought to regulate a legal secondary market. 130
Lowson, the defendant, and his company purchased large blocks of event tickets using “bots” and
then resold the tickets in the secondary market for a profit.131 Online ticket vendors used certain
measures like buypage encryption, IP blocks, and CAPTCHA code to try and ensure the general
public would be able to purchase tickets with no one gaining an advantage. 132 Lowson and his
company used “bots” to avoid these measures and purchase tickets that were otherwise available
to them and the rest of the general public.133

The only issue was in the way Lowson’s team

purchased tickets. Lowson was indicted, but the case was resolved prior to a trial with all parties
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129 United States v. Lowson, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 145647(D.N.J. Oct. 12, 2010).
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agreeing out of court.134 This case, like much of the law regarding the CFAAs reach as it pertains
to “bots,” failed to take a strong stance for or against their inherent legality.

ii.

Civil Application of the CFAA in Other Contexts

Courts have permitted civil CFAA claims to succeed based on Terms of Service violations, but
allowing these violations to carry into the criminal context can be a dangerous precedent. In the
civil context when automated programming “bots” and “data mining” were involved, the court
found CFAA violations without substantial analysis.
When a website owner sought to enforce its Terms of Service and stop defendants from sending
“unsolicited bulk e-mail” messages, more commonly known as spam, to its members, it brought a
CFAA claim in the Eastern District of Virginia.135 The defendant, LCGM, maintained numerous
America Online (AOL) memberships that provided the company with access to AOL chatrooms. 136
With this access, LCGM used an extractor “bot” to collect email addresses of other AOL
members.137

LCGM, which operated pornographic websites, sent approximately 300,000

unsolicited emails a day to the AOL email addresses it collected with the “bot.”138
The District Court found AOL’s Terms of Service controlling on what constitutes authorized
access.139 Without significant analysis, the court found AOL member email addresses to be
protected information that was proprietary to AOL.140 Because sending spam was contrary to
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135 America Online v. LCGM, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 2d 444 (E.D. Va.1998).
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AOL’s Terms of Service, the court reasoned that it constituted “exceeding authorized access”
when obtained via “extractor software programs”—data mining, “bots”.141 The court determined
that LCGM was liable under §1030(a)(2)(C) for exceeding any access AOL had granted it as a
member when it used “extractor software programs” that violated AOL’s Terms of Service. 142 The
court also found the requisite damage to AOL’s computer network because the defendants used
“bots” to “camouflage[] their identities, and evade[] plaintiff's blocking filters and its member s'
mail controls.”143
In a similar case in the Northern District of Iowa, AOL sought to enforce its Terms of Service
through the CFAA against a third-party email sender.144 Defendant National Healthcare Discount,
Inc., purchased leads (email addresses) from an independent contractor and sent marketing
materials to the purchased addresses.145 Despite recognizing that “the evidence presented at trial
failed to clear the murky water sufficiently” to determine if Terms of Service violations constitute
“without authorization,” the court relied on its preliminary conclusion, without analysis, that it
“exceeds authorized access.”146 The court also found the requisite damage based on evidence that
each unsolicited email sent over AOL’s system cost AOL $0.00078 and diminished AOL’s
capacity to serve its customers.147
The United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit also found that an express provision
limiting “the use of scrapers” in a website’s Terms of Service to be dispositive on whether access
was authorized.148 Absent an express provision, inferring a violation of the CFAA would not be
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practical and the website owner would likely have to show that the information was confidentia l. 149
EF Cultural Travel, a travel company, brought suit under the CFAA against a competitor
(Explorica) as well as the “scraper” creator company (Zefer).150

Zefer, the “bot” creator,

developed a computer program that copied price information for various travel options on EF
Cultural Travel’s website.151

Explorica hired Zefer to create this tool and provide it with EF

Cultural Travel’s pricing information.

Explorica used the information to set its prices slightly

below Explorica’s and gain a competitive advantage. 152 EF Cultural sued under both the CFAA
and copyright statutes. The court found the copyright claim to be meritless, but allowed the CFAA
claim even though the behavior did not violate any stated Terms of Service. 153
The First Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that Explorica could have compiled the same
database of EF Cultural Travel’s pricing information, albeit not as quickly, without “scrapers,” but
differentiated the two situations without any further explanation. 154 The court held that it “would
raise serious public policy concerns” to allow the CFAA to enforce an explicit provision in a
website’s Terms of Service that limits competitors from manually using public information on the
website to create a database, but failed to address how a competitor that compiles the same
information more efficiently with “bots” could be condemned without issue.155 While the court
stated these broad propositions without practical support and its arguable general fear of “bots” is
unfounded, neither issue directly influenced the court’s holding. The key reason for the court’s
civil injunction was based on the existence of a confidentiality agreement signed between
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defendant employee of a competitor and the website owner which clearly exceeded access of the
computer servers.156
Some courts analyzing a CFAA claim based on a beach of contract recognized the danger in
allowing contracts to form the basis of federal statutory violations.157

When an employee had

access to an employer computer and network, but violated a term of his employment contract by
using the computer to email company documents, including financial statements and client lists,
to his personal computer prior to leaving the company, the United States Court of Appeals found
there was no valid CFAA claim.158
LVRC brought a CFAA claim against a former employee alleging that his use of company
computers violated§1030(a)(2)(4) because it was unauthorized and his use of company email to
send himself documents exceeded any authorization he was given. 159 Brekka, the former employee
was given access and log-in information for LVRC’s computers as part of his employment. 160 The
information he emailed to himself likewise was related to his work for LVRC. 161

After

termination, Brekka used his unexpired log-in information to send himself additional informa tio n
from his company email address.162 LVRC argued this use was unauthorized or alternative ly
exceeded any authorization he had when his employment terminated. 163
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized that Brekka may have acted against LVRC’s
wishes, but that does not rise to a CFAA violation. Just because the individual violated a duty of
loyalty or state law claim does not mean they violated the CFAA. 164 “Nothing in the CFAA
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suggests that a defendant's liability for accessing a computer without authorization turns on
whether the defendant breached a state law duty of loyalty to an employer.”165

The court

understood that contracts cannot govern distinct federal laws. 166 The individual also logged onto
the company website to access statistics and other company information using an old password,
over a year after his employment ended.167 Even after the employment ended and the individua l
became a competitor, the court found no basis for a CFAA claim.

So long as individuals are

authorized to use a computer, they “remain authorized… even if the [individual] violates those
limitations.”168

V. The CFAA Does Not Criminalize The General Use Of Automated “Bots” That May Be
Contrary To Terms Of Service Contracts

“Bots” do not inherently violate the CFAA. They are tools that can be used both legally for
valid business purposes or illegally to cause harm. Like almost any other new technology, “bots”
have unknown potential and can be either abused or esteemed.169 New technology scares people.
Until they can fully understand it, some people will fear it and try to condemn its use.170 Because
of this, leaving “bot” use practices to prosecutorial discretion has failed. It has proven to be an
insufficient way of dealing with the new technology and its potential criminal component.
The internet is not a foreign unknown like it once was and has not been so for a long time. In
2011, the United States Census Bureau found that nearly 76% of households had a computer, up
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from just under 62% in 2003 and roughly 8% in 1984 when the CFAA was first conceived.171 It
is not reasonable to argue that just because a term references computers it is automatica lly
ambiguous and confusing. While some commenters argue the CFAA is ambiguous and can be
stretched by courts to cover a wide array of behavior, most of these arguments focus on the internet
as a great unknown.172
At the same time, if we are to follow previous commenters reasoning that the language is
ambiguous because of the technical nature of the internet and website use, it cannot be followed
that the statute suddenly covers Terms of Service contract issues without some legisla tive
guidance. “Legislatures and not the courts should define criminal activity.”173 Congress could not
have conceived that Terms of Service breaches would fall under the provisions of the CFAA
because websites didn’t even exist in 1986 when the statute was adopted.174 On April 30, 1993,
CERN published a statement that put CERN software into the public domain, essentially making
the internet available to the public.175 In a time before publicly-available computers or websites,
Congress could not have contemplated “unauthorized access” to include violation of a website’s
Terms of Service.176 When the CFAA was created, the idea of a global internet used daily by
hundreds of millions of people was not even contemplated. While it is important for statutes to be
flexible and grow with time, allowing such profound changes as granting private website owners
discretion to set the limits of criminal activity cannot be permitted.
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In enacting the CFAA, the Judiciary Committee found Federal criminal penalties “appropriate
punishment for certain acts” not for every unwanted computer activity and it should be reinforced
with improved security programs.177 If the CFAA can be used to criminalize breach of contract
disputes, everything from “making a fake Facebook account for your cat” to letting your “friend
log in to your Pandora account could land you with felony charges,” all because you clicked “I
agree.”178
Breach of contract based CFAA claims could easily prove unmanageable given the prevalence
of arbitration clauses. Recently many online companies have incorporated arbitration clauses into
their Terms of Service.179 If breach of a Terms of Service agreement can serve as the basis for a
CFAA violation, proof of the breach would be a required element of the offense. This element
may not be so easy to adjudicate, however, given required forums specified in the contract. “Minitrials on breaches of contract would be required to establish criminal liability.”180
Some have argued that as a broad policy, Terms of Service violations cannot serve as the
foundation for a CFAA claim, but using automated software code is more akin to unlawful
“hacking” and should be barred by the CFAA.181 According to proponents of this theory, the
purpose of automated programs is to bypass security and defeat barriers to access.182 “Data
mining,” “scrubbers,” “scrapers,” and other automated programs, however, are less about attacking
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KSH).
182 Brief for Defendant at 12-13, United States v. Lowson, 2010 WL 9552416 (D.N.J. Oct. 12, 2010) (No. CRIM.
10-114 KSH).
178

28

security measures and more focused on efficiency.183 The CFAA cannot be applied by fiat to any
Terms of Service contractual theory just because a “bot” was used.

i.

Automated Bots Are Useful Tools to Promote Competition and Improve
Efficiency

“Data mining” is a valuable tool with “enormous application in numerous fields.”184
According to the Society for Industrial and Applied Mathematics International Conference on Data
Mining, high-performance analysis and algorithms can pool large, complex datasets and extract
useful information for businesses.185
Automated programming code, just like anything else, can be used properly and for a benefic ia l
purpose or can be used to deleterious ends. The purpose of the CFAA is to criminalize certain
illegal behavior over the internet in regards to computer access. “Bots,” just like hacking, connotes
a scary and malicious image, but only because certain groups have been successful in persuading
courts and people in power to believe so. The technology that goes into a “beneficial webbot” as
compared to a destructive one designed to disrupt networks, infect servers with viruses, or “hack”
private information, is identical.186 The main difference is intent. The CFAA cannot be used to
broadly sweep over all automated programs that collect public information and should be reserved
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for only those that violate the Act’s provisions, either by using fraud and causing damage, mining
confidential financial information, or accessing protected government information.
“Webbots” have vast untapped potential and can make e-commerce and internet use as a whole
immensely more efficient.187 “Webbots” can acquire useful information in an infinitesimally small
fraction of the time it takes an individual or even a team of individuals. “Webbots” can be created
for specific tasks and can automate virtually any process, notifying a user only when something
requires their attention.188 While some of those tasks may be illegal, others are not only legal, but
beneficial. Speed and efficiency are key for a business advantage and “webbots” can even be used
to locate and track information quickly, as is the case with this google short url footnote. 189
“Webbots” improve business efficiency and competition.

A sweeping policy against them all,

aside from being overbroad and reaching perfectly legal actions, will have a severe chilling effect
that will hurt economic growth.190
Everything from customer service, to stock trading and banking, to surveillance, is progressing
towards automation.191 While some people appreciate the efficiency and cost reductions that go
along with automation, others prefer a reversion back to pre-robot interaction.192 Preferences are
permissible, but they do not correspond to legality.
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something most consumers want, few would argue that it should be criminalized. It is likely that
nearly half of all jobs in America will be automated in the next 20 years.193 Opponents of this
argue that unemployment will rise and the economy will suffer. Proponents, however, argue that
machines will likely not replace human involvement in the economy, but will actually allow
individuals to focus on other tasks and improve efficiency.194
While many customers would prefer interaction with a real human being, they would not prefer
the increased costs that go along with it. There are some inherent flaws, and “bots” can be created
with nefarious intent, but the pros outweigh the cons. Automated business solutions can reduce
operating and training costs, promote competition and innovation, and protect individ ua l
privacy.195
The solution for overcoming competitive “bot” use is not criminalizing it outright, but allowing
free competition for non-harmful “bots” and focusing enforcement efforts only on those acts that
actually violate the CFAA by causing damage or accessing unauthorized, non-public informatio n.
Otherwise, large companies with more bargaining power can seek to criminalize innocent conduct
and insulate themselves from any real competition.196
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Automated “bots” are used by the same companies that seek to criminalize the behavior by
those that visit the companies’ sites. Buried as one of Yelp’s restrictions on its Terms of Service
page is a prohibition on “any robot, spider, site search/retrieval application, or other automated
device, process or means to access, retrieve, scrape, or index any portion of the Site or any Site
Content.”197 To maintain its competitive edge and ensure it provides a valuable service however,
Yelp uses automated bots regularly on its site. 198 There is even a video explaining the automated
software, how it was designed, and how it automatically and efficiently seeks out certain posted
material for exclusion without human input. 199 The company goes so far as to seek feedback from
the public to improve its “bots.”200 As is the natural competitive process, marketing companies
have emerged to defeat Yelp’s “bots” and avoid its automated filters.201 Just like any other “bots,”
defeating Yelp’s automated bots can have nefarious intent. The main reason these defeating “bots”
are used however, is to preserve legitimate, positive reviews. 202 Nevertheless, the intent is to get
around Yelp’s “bots.” Clearly this behavior is frowned upon by Yelp. No one has sought crimina l
punishment against Yelp when the site uses its own “bots” to maintain the integrity of its reviews .
If, however, these marketing companies used “bots” that were smarter than Yelp’s own “bots” to
preserve their positive reviews, somehow Yelp would argue it becomes a criminal violation.
As discussed, “bots” are most often used for one of three purposes on third-party websites:
buypage encryption; internet protocol blocks; and CAPTCHA code. 203 “Bots” are used in these
arenas both for benign and malicious purposes. While some users employ “bots” to illegal ends,
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others have valid, beneficial reasons. On checkout screens, or buypages, “bots” can be used
illegally to extract others’ purchasing information, but also legally to access checkout pages and
purchase goods efficiently and quickly. Companies that seek to criminalize all bot use do not do
it for altruistic reasons, but mainly to limit competition and insulate themselves. Website owners
can freely determine what is illegal and what is not at the federal level if the CFAA will blindly
enforce any action that may be against the preferences of private website owners and contrary to
the private Terms of Service contracts they create with users.
While it has been argued that using a “bot” on a website’s buypage is “akin to drilling through
the side of a bank vault,”204 the analogy only holds if the purpose of the drilling is to put more
money in the bank. Buypage encryption can be used legitimately by website owners to restrict
purchases for certain individuals.205 When used properly it can help the website owner limit his
or her liability.206 Some websites, however, use it to stop purchases that occur in quick succession,
a clear indication of “bot” use. In this regard, the website is stopping valid sales that bring the site
more revenue faster. Just as with any “bots,” use on buypages can be benign and done to efficie ntly
pay the website or can be done with nefarious intent. The CFAA should be narrow enough to
effectively handle the latter without criminalizing the former. Legal “bot” use that is unwanted
can be limited through a buypage block, but the access is not unauthorized and thus not illegal. It
is up to website owners to keep out who they do not want, not the courts.
Internet protocol (IP) blocks can help website owners to keep “hackers” out and not allow them
to damage information,207 but they cannot be installed to bottleneck certain users or enforce
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preferences in all situations.208 If left up to the individual websites to determine legality and that
is freely enforced by the CFAA, “IP blocking can have profound impacts on the ability to
communicate freely.”209

If any user who gets around an IP block is violating the CFAA, any

validly used IP masking tool is a criminal offense. Individual users who want to protect their
identity and location and avoid viruses themselves, can hide their IP addresses using a number of
tools on the internet,210 Theoretically then, anyone who hides their IP address should face federal
criminal charges. Using a “bot” versus doing it yourself should have no impact on the outcome.
Because courts have argued it would be against public policy to hold individuals liable crimina lly
just because a website would prefer they not do something,211 the fact that they use a “bot” to do
the same should be of no importance.
CAPTCHA code, like most other devices employed by websites can serve a valid purpose as
protection from illegal uses, but allowing any user navigation that conflicts with website tools like
CAPTCHA code to be criminalized by the CFAA is a slippery slope. With CAPTCHA code,
unlike buypage encryption or IP blocks, “bots” are the principal targets.212 CAPTCHA does,
however, have numerous uses and effects besides preventing malicious attacks on websites. 213
Website owners can use CAPTCHA code as a way of enforcing their preferences against “bots,”
but using the federal government through the CFAA to carry out these preferences is reaching too
far. Even worse than making those who want to protect their IP addresses criminals, certain
disabled people need CAPTCHA defeating software. Criminalizing these “bots” would make any
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visually impaired person a potential criminal offender if they use legal software to improve their
internet experience.214

ii.

Automated Bots Do Not Inherently Cause Damage to any Statutorily Protected
Computer Nor Presumptively Violate the CFAA

“Bot” use to acquire otherwise public information does not cause the requisite damage to any
protected computer. Using terms like “hacking” and “virtual breaking and entering” connotes
destruction of property, but persuasive language is not the same as actual damage. While the
damage need not be physical destruction of the computer or server, there must be a tangible
negative harm to the website or the owner’s system. Criminal punishment is not justified by a
theoretical, non-quantifiable harm.215
While some website owners seeking to enforce their Terms of Service through the CFAA have
successfully convinced courts that “bots” damage computer systems,216 their proof of damage was
unpersuasive.

Most arguments that “bot” activity causes damage relate to bandwidth, server

capacity, and the ability of other users to access the site. Website owners argue that because “bots”
can search through data at a much faster rate than individuals they “consume at least a portion of
plaintiff's bandwidth and server capacity.”217

The argument is akin to using more than your

allotment of a finite resource so there is less for everyone else. Even without evidence that this
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actually cost the website owner revenue or customers, the court found the requisite damage.218
The key distinction for the court was the use of “bots.” If a group of people engaged in the same
behavior and used the same share of bandwidth it is highly unlikely the website owner would have
sought help from the CFAA and the federal courts.
This deference to the website owner’s discretion touches on the real reason “bots” are targeted
by website owners and as a matter of public policy. They are used primarily by competitors.
Website owners have convinced the courts that “bots” are akin to unauthorized hacking in order
to prevent competition in a public forum. The real impetus for website owners is not actual harm
to their computer systems but protection from increased competition.219

"Established online

merchants have a substantial incentive … to interfere with the flow of price and product
information on the Internet.”220
In many cases, the “bots” do exactly what an individual user would and provide the same
economic benefit to a website. In a similar case to Bidder’s Edge, ticket resellers were indicted
under the CFAA for purchasing bulk event tickets. 221 Ticketmaster doesn’t mind if someone buys
all of the tickets they sell, considering that is exactly what they are in business to do. But they
successfully got a competitor indicted for doing the same thing just because the competitor planned
to resell the tickets later for a mark-up.222 Either way, Ticketmaster sold the tickets they wanted
to sell.
In other cases, “bots” pool public information off of websites for use in marketing or other
business practices. Courts have allowed CFAA claims to persist even when the informa tio n
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obtained was public simply because the website owner argued the “bot” impaired the website’s
capacity to serve the rest of its customers.223 Congress clearly did not intend the CFAA to be a
tool against economic competition and protectionism especially given most legislation in the area
of economic activity favors free market competition and penalizes anti-competitive practices.224
“Bot” use that goes against a website’s terms of service is also not inherently unauthorized or
exceeding authorized access. Courts have previously held that contractual restrictions, while they
may speak to misappropriation, do not invoke the CFAA.”225

The CFAA is focused on

“unauthorized” or “exceeding authorized” access and damage that subsequently arises. Despite
the fact that “bots” may use the information provided in a different way, the access is not violated.
“Bots” may be at odds with a Terms of Service policy, but may still access a company’s website
for its intended function and thus is not a CFAA violation. 226 Websites are designed to allow users
to accomplish some specific purpose. Especially with public websites that anyone can access and
use, “in no sense can [a “bot”] be considered an ‘outside hacker.’”227
The CFAA does not forbid using a “protected computer” for any prohibited purpose, but only
for “unauthorized” or “exceeding authorized” access.228 Terms of Service do not govern who has
authorization to access, which could be more in-line with “access.”229

223

They may speak to

Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 980 (N.D. Cal.2013).
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 (Sherman Antitrust Act prohibited certain business activities that are anticompetitive);
15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (Clayton Antitrust Act prohibited specified anticompetitive conduct and established and
enforcement mechanism.).
225 See e.g. United States v. Nosal, 676 F.3d 854, 863 (9th Cir. Cal.2012) (“The phrase ‘exceeds authorized access’ in
the CFAA does not extend to violations of use restrictions. If Congress wants to incorporate misappropriation liability
into the CFAA, it must speak more clearly.”); See also, Power Equip. Maint., Inc. v. AIRCO Power Servs., Inc., 953
F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1296 (S.D. Ga. 2013) (“The language of the CFAA simply prohibits accessing information either
without authorization or in excess of authorized access. 18 U.S.C. § 1030. It does not confer upon employers the
ability to sue their employees in federal court for violations of company policy regarding computer usage.”).
226 Southwest Airlines Co. v. BoardFirst, L.L.C.,2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96230 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 12, 2007).
227 Id.
228 Id.
229 Craigslist Inc. v. 3Taps Inc., 942 F. Supp. 2d 962, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2013).
224

37

measures, but this goes beyond “access” and into topics not under the CFAA. 230 Website owners
can limit means of access contractually through Terms of Service, but Congress never intended to
criminalize Terms of Service violators under the U.S. Code, and did not incorporate contractual
breaches into the design of the CFAA.
Previous CFAA convictions based on Terms of Service breaches often concerned behavior that
was independently illegal or touched on public policy concerns. When an individual engaged in
cyberbullying that ultimately resulted in a suicide, the jury originally convicted the individ ua l
under the CFAA.231 The court recognized that a website owner should be able to determine the
extent that the public can view information on his website. Likewise, the court found that website
owners “can relay and impose those limitations/restrictions/conditions by means of written notice
such as Terms of Service or use provisions placed on the home page of the website.”232 While this
is true, it is an entirely different argument to say that those members of the public who do not abide
by the owner’s terms go beyond breach of contract and into potential criminal sanctions.

The

court found that it was conceivable “access” could be limited by Terms of Service based on
standard definitions, and other courts have interpreted “access” in this way.233 Nevertheless, such
an interpretation of “access” cannot be used to justify criminal convictions. 234

If a “conscious

breach of a website’s [T]erms of [S]ervice” is enough to be deemed “access without authoriza tio n
or in excess of authorization,” the law becomes too tenuous and affords too much discretion to law
enforcement and too little notice to internet users. 235
conviction.236
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Because of the court vacated the jury

Some courts have found the CFAA potentially applicable in cases where the user acted as any
individual would in providing business to the website owner, but did so using means against the
Terms of Service. In a case involving event ticket resellers, the website owner sought crimina l
charges when a competitor purchased bulk tickets off the owner’s website.237 Although the case
settled prior to any potential conviction, the District Court allowed an indictment to stand despite
the fact that the alleged violator purchased tickets, for the same price any user would have and
only used “bots” to acquire as many tickets as possible, providing the website owner with
income.238 Although the defendant argued code-based restrictions were basically means for the
website owner to enforce its contractual agreement and not grounds for a CFAA claim239 , the court
found the CFAA potentially applicable even when the only information obtained was accessible
to other users.240

Interpreting the Drew case, the court found breach of contract claims not

necessarily covered by the CFAA, but breach of code-based restrictions more in line with
“hacking.”241

iii.

Prosecutorial Discretion Is Not A Valid Means of Controlling The CFAA

Some commenters argue that the district court and jury had the law right in Drew and
“theoretically the law fit[] the crime as charged.”242 The argument is that prosecutors did the right
thing in favoring a misdemeanor charge as opposed to a felony.243
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While prosecutorial discretion can theoretically fill the gap between what is a serious crimina l
wrong and what is unwanted but, to some, borderline illegal, in practice it provides too much
leeway in sentencing and places way too much power in non-legislative government hands. At
the same time, if Terms of Service set the parameters for a CFAA violation any time automated
programs or “bots” are used, the scope of the government’s prosecutorial authority is determined
by private parties in how they unilateral draft the terms.244 CFAA violations based on Terms of
Service contracts allow website owners to, in essence, become private attorneys general and
control the limits of legal internet use.
Those who believe any “bot” use contrary to a website’s Terms of Service can lead to crimina l
liability may argue the true purpose of the CFAA would be deterrence. The threat of crimina l
liability, according to some, should be enough to deter individuals who would otherwise employ
automated programs to act against a website owner’s preferences. 245 It is easy to argue small-time
“bot” use will not be punished by the CFAA and prosecutors will seek to only penalize those who
operate on a large scale with malicious intent. Theory, however, rarely comports to reality.
While the threat of criminal prosecution may deter individuals from using automated “bots”
contravening a website’s Terms of Service, it could also lead to an actual criminal prosecution and
jail time. Relying on the discretion of private website owners and government prosecutors to set
the scope of a federal act is dangerous and unprecedented. What happens when the alleged contract
violator meets a prosecutor who wants to set an example or the controversy touches on a politica l
candidate’s platform, or hits a nerve with some other individual in power?246
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Aaron Swartz, a computer programmer responsible for building RSS, Reddit, and Creative
Commons used his technology based skillset to promote information transparency over the
internet.247

His creations are used daily by millions of people. 248 In late 2010 and early 2011

Swartz allegedly downloaded 4.8 million JSTOR articles from MIT servers, most likely to make
the academic research freely available to the public. 249
There is no debate that what Swartz did was illegal and technically violated the CFAA—the
information was not otherwise public, but was password protected. Swartz seemed to recognize
this as well, but also knew that MIT promoted freedom of information and the power of collective
thought and Swartz believed he “likely wouldn’t get in too much trouble,”250 because the only real
damage he caused by making journal articles publicly available was delay in access time for true
JSTOR users.
Swartz’s belief was wrong and the government abused discretion and decided to use him as an
example. Initially, the court issued a blanket protective order keeping Swartz from distributing
the documents.251
Swartz was indicted on numerous federal charges including multiple violations of the CFAA252
In an apparent attempt to use Swartz as a sacrificial lamb and discourage future CFAA violatio ns,
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the US Attorney indicted Swartz on charges that carried a potential 35 years in prison and a $1
million fine.253 Rather than face criminal prosecution and serious prison time, Swartz committed
suicide in January 2013.254
Political figures and members of the public recognized the danger in leaving so much
discretion to prosecutors. Even a prominent US Senator who endorsed the CFAA and argued
digital theft is still theft questioned the US Attorney’s conduct. 255 Senator John Cornyn wrote to
Attorney General Eric Holder, questioning the prosecutorial misconduct surrounding the Aaron
Swartz case.256 Cornyn questioned the proportionality of the conduct to the penalty and the
retaliatory motives of the prosecution. 257 To prevent a similar a similar situation and alleviate any
fears for prosecutorial abuse, Aaron’s Law was proposed. 258 Unfortunately the law has stalled and
there remains the fear that prosecutors can arbitrarily enforce the CFAA how they please.
Prosecutorial discretion is also a problem because of the duplicative nature of the statute. By
using redundant terms, the CFAA punishes one act multiple times.259 A prosecutor can easily
stack charges on an individual, threatening them with serious jail time. 260

This leverage can

pressure a violator to accept a deal and plea to one charge, thinking it is their best alternative given
the situation.261 This bullying tactic can be abused both at trial and sentencing to severely punish
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individuals who may commit minor infractions given the language of the statute. 262 Unfortunately,
it can also lead to suicide when the threats become too real and an unknowing violator is backed
into a corner.263
At the same time, if a fear of prosecutorial abuse were not troublesome enough under the
current CFAA structure, the Obama administration has called for stronger CFAA penalties, which
would tip further towards possible abuses of discretion. 264 The Obama administration has altered
its stance numerous times over the previous few years, but consistently favors increasing penalties
for most “bot” or code-based actions.265 While the proposal aims to ensure “that insignifica nt
conduct does not fall within the scope of the statute,” and supposedly focuses more on prosecuting
“insiders who abuse their ability to access information to use it for their own purposes,” some of
the proposed text would still increase “bot” penalties and leave much to discretion.266 The origina l
proposed criminal provisions, and those still currently proposed, would add a mandatory threeyear minimum penalty for damaging certain computers. 267 Most criminal violations of the CFAA
would have increased potential penalties under the Obama administration’s proposal. 268 The
newest proposal for the CFAA would expand on the definition of “exceeds authorized access” and
encompass uses that the accesser knows the computer owner would not want. 269
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Leaning towards the opposite end of the spectrum, the justice department acknowledged the
potential for abuse and inferred it was open to shoring up some ambiguity.270

The justice

department recommended congressional action to amend the CFAA and make it more difficult for
the government to prosecute less serious statutory violations. 271

VI. Conclusion

The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) is a useful tool to limit theft and damage to digita l
information, but courts and prosecutors have arbitrarily enforced and overextended it. 272 It has
been stretched beyond what Congress intended, to include actions that cannot legitimately be
deemed criminal. Prosecutors will have no reason to focus their energy on truly harmful crimina l
behavior if courts continue to construe the CFAA more and more broadly, and encroach on
rulemaking themselves.273
When Congress first created the CFAA and some state legislatures followed suit with related
state statutes, no one had any idea that there would be something like the global Internet, much
less "bots" that would be mining data on such a huge scale. “Bots,” just like any technology, can
be encouraged and used in a positive way or exploited and misused. They are not inherently bad,
but in fact can lead to tremendous advances. The CFAA was designed to be flexible and adapt to
future technology and innovation, but it has proven unable to keep pace. It is really a case of a

Brian Fung, The Justice Department Used This Law to Pursue Aaron Swartz. Now It’s Open to Reforming It , THE
W ASHINGT ON POST ONLINE, (Feb. 7, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2014/02/07/thejustice-department-used-this-law-to-pursue-aaron-swartz-now-its-open-to-reforming-it/.
271 Id.
272 See, supra Part II.
273 See, Kerr, supra note 5.
270

44

statute that has been left in the dust by technology. The answer to this problem is legislation, not
judicial or prosecutorial interpretation and expansion.
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